Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne Reyes (G.R. No. 155800)

FACTS: In 1990, Leo married Marie, the latter being ten years his senior. In 1993, Leo filed to annul the marriage due to Marie’s Psychological Incapacity. Leo claimed that Marie persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She would claim that she is a psychologist but she is not. She’d claim she is a singer with the company Blackgold and that she is the latter’s number 1 money maker but she’s not. She’d also spend lavishly as opposed to her monthly income. She fabricates things and people only to serve her make believe world. Leo presented an expert that proved Marie’s PI. Marie denied all Leo’s allegations and also presented an expert to prove her case. The RTC ruled against Marie and annulled the marriage. The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage and was affirmed by the Vatican’s Roman Rata. The CA reversed the decision hence the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant to the case.

HELD: Yes, Psychological Incapacity is attendant. The guidelines established in the Molina case is properly established in the case at bar.

The SC also emphasized what fraud means as contemplated in Art 45 (3) of the FC vis a vis Art 46 of the FC. In PI, the misrepresentation done by Marie points to her inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In Art 45 (3), marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.” These provisions of Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be applied in the case at bar because the misrepresentations done by Marie is not considered as fraud but rather such misrepresentations constitute her aberrant behaviour which further constitutes PI. Her misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate Leo’s consent to marry her. Her misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish fiction/fantasy from reality which is so grave and it falls under the fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.

The Family Code

MARRIAGE is
1. A special contract
2. Of permanent union
3. Between a man and a woman
4. Entered into in accordance with law
5. For the establishment of conjugal and family
life

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE:
1. Legal capacity of contracting parties
2. Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer

FORMAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE:
1. Authority of solemnizing officer
2. Valid marriage license (except in cases where a marriage license is not required), valid only for 120 days from issue in any part of the Philippines
3. Marriage ceremony where the contracting parties appear before the solemnizing officer, with their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age

Garcia vs Recio (G.R. No. 138322)

Foreign Law – Divorce

FACTS: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, respondent entered into marriage with petitioner a Filipina on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Responded contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry petitioner. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent dissolved and both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to remarry.

HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera (G.R. No. 80116)

FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case for adultery should prosper.
Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Van Dorn vs Romillo (G.R. No. L-68470)

Nationality Principle – Divorce

FACTS:

Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner’s business in Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.

HELD:

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)

Facts:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought “danger and dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusband’s last name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

Issue:

Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.”

Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”