Reno vs American Civil Liberties Union

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FACTS:

The United States Congress made its first notable attempt to regulate pornographic material on the internet through ‘The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).

This is the landmark cyberlaw case whereby the United States Supreme Court struck the anti-indecency provisions of the Act.

The Act affected the Internet in two significant ways:

1. It attempted to regulate both indecency and obscenity in cyberspace (when available to children).
2. Operators of Internet services are not to be construed as publishers (thus they are not liable for words of third parties who use their services)

The relevant sections of the Act were introduced in response to fears that Internet pornography was on the rise, and it marked the first attempt to expand regulations to this new form of media.

Passed by Congress on February 1, 1996, and signed by President Bill Clinton on February 8, 1996, the CDA imposed criminal sanctions on anyone who knowingly

(A) Uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.

It further criminalized the transmission of materials that were “obscene or indecent” to persons known to be under 18.

The government’s main defense of the CDA was that similar decency laws had been upheld in three prior Supreme Court decisions and that the CDA should be similarly upheld :

1.  Ginsberg v. New York (1968) – the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute that prohibited selling to minors under 17 years of age material that was considered obscene as to them even if not obscene as to adult
2. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation (1978 – the Supreme Court had upheld the possibility of the FCC delivering administrative sanctions to a radio station for broadcasting George Carlin’s monologue titled “Filthy Words
3. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (1986) – the Supreme Court had upheld a zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theaters out of residential neighborhoods

The government argued that the CDA was an attempt to institute “a sort of ‘cyberzoning’ on the Internet”.

ISSUES:

Whether the statutory provisions enacted to protect minors from “indecent” and “patently offensive” communications on the internet abridges the “freedom of speech” clause of the US Constitution.

Whether the CDA promotes compelling interests and least restrictive means to further governmental interest to curb down the publication of  pornographic, indecent and obscene materials via Internet.

HELD:

 The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the two provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) that prohibited indecent communications to minors on the Internet. It may be found constitutional only if it serves “to promote a compelling interest” and is “the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”

Considering whether the CDA is the least restrictive means to further the governmental interest, the Court found that “the Government failed to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA.”

The Court held that:

The CDA’s “burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve…The governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials… does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.

The Court held that despite the intent to protect minors from inappropriate materials, the statute abridged “the freedom of speech”

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote in his conclusion:

We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.

Notes Bene:

First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Freedom of speech in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is provided on Article III, Section 4 of the Bill of Rights, stating that:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Light Rail Transit Authority & Rodolfo Roman vs. Marjorie Natividad, Heirs of Nicanor Navidad & Prudent Security Agency

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, versus
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY

FACTS:

Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached him. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. The widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. Trial court ruled in favor Navidad’s wife and against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin . LRTA and Rodolfo Roman were dismissed for lack of merit. CA held LRTA and Roman liable, hence the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a perfected contract of carriage between Navidad and LRTA

HELD:

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability

Contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation. The appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise

Dangwa Transportation vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. Petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence and that it was the victim’s own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject incident.

RTC pronounced that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent, which negligence was the proximate cause of his death. However, Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the lower court, and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents damages due to negligence.

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and in finding petitioners negligent and liable for the damages claimed.

HELD: CA Decision AFFIRMED

The testimonies of the witnesses show that that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same. They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the deceased was guilty of negligence.

It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.

Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.

JG Summit Holdings vs. Court of Appeals

JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST and PHILYARDS HOLDINGS G.R. No. 124293. November 20, 2000

 

FACTS:

National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries entered into a Joint Venture Agreement in a shipyard business named PHILSECO, with a shareholding of 60-40 respectively. NIDC’s interest was later transferred to the National Government.

Pursuant to President Aquino’s Proclamation No.5, which established the Committee on Privatization (COP) and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), and allowed for the disposition of the government’s non-performing assets, the latter allowed Kawasaki Heavy Industries to choose a company to which it has stockholdings, to top the winning bid of JG Summit Holdings over PHILSECO. JG Summit protested alleging that such act would effectively increase Kawasaki’s interest in PHILSECO—a shipyard is a public utility–and thus violative of the Constitution.

 

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents’ act is valid.

 

HELD:
No.
A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law, the following provision of the Article XII of the Constitution applies:

“Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association shall be citizens of the Philippines.”

Notably, paragraph 1.4 of the JVA accorded the parties the right of first refusal “under the same terms.” This phrase implies that when either party exercises the right of first refusal under paragraph 1.4, they can only do so to the extent allowed them by paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of the JVA or under the proportion of 60%-40% of the shares of stock. Thus, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock of SNS or PHILSECO. The NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization.

Lita Enterprises, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

LITA ENTERPRISES, INC., vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, NICASIO M. OCAMPO and FRANCISCA P. GARCIA.
[G.R. No. L-64693 April 27, 1984]

FACTS:

Sometime in 1966, the spouses Nicasio M. Ocampo and Francisca Garcia, herein private respondents, purchased in installment from the Delta Motor Sales Corporation five (5) Toyota Corona Standard cars to be used as taxicabs. Since they had no franchise to operate taxicabs, they contracted with petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc., through its representative, Manuel Concordia, for the use of the latter’s certificate of public convenience in consideration of an initial payment of P1,000.00 and a monthly rental of P200.00 per taxicab unit. To effectuate Id agreement, the aforesaid cars were registered in the name of petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc, Possession, however, remained with tile spouses Ocampo who operated and maintained the same under the name Acme Taxi, petitioner’s trade name.

About a year later one of said taxicabs driven by their employee, Emeterio Martin, collided with a motorcycle whose driver, one Florante Galvez, died from the head injuries sustained therefrom. A criminal case was eventually filed against the driver Emeterio Martin, while a civil case for damages was instituted by Rosita Sebastian Vda. de Galvez, heir of the victim, against Lita Enterprises, Inc., as registered owner of the taxicab in the latter case. Petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc. was adjudged liable for damages by the CFI.

This decision having become final, a writ of execution was issued. Two of the vehicles of respondent spouses were levied upon and sold at public auction.

Thereafter, Nicasio Ocampo decided to register his taxicabs in his name. He requested the manager of petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc. to turn over the registration papers to him, but the latter allegedly refused. Hence, he and his wife filed a complaint against Lita Enterprises, Inc., Mrs. de Galvez and the Sheriff of Manila for reconveyance of motor vehicles with damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has a cause of action against defendants.

HELD:

No.
Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement, commonly known as the “kabit system”, whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motors vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government . Abuse of this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. The “kabit system” has been Identified as one of the root causes of the prevalence of graft and corruption in the government transportation offices. In the words of Chief Justice Makalintal, “this is a pernicious system that cannot be too severely condemned. It constitutes an imposition upon the goo faith of the government.

Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the “kabit system” is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and inexistent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it finds them. Upon this premise, it was flagrant error on the part of both the trial and appellate courts to have accorded the parties relief from their predicament. Article 1412 of the Civil Code denies them such aid. It provides:

ART. 1412. if the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:

(1) when the fault, is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking.

Having entered into an illegal contract, neither can seek relief from the courts, and each must bear the consequences of his acts.

The defect of inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable, and cannot be cured by ratification or by prescription. As this Court said in Eugenio v. Perdido, “the mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null void.”

The principle of in pari delicto is well known not only in this jurisdiction but also in the United States where common law prevails. Under American jurisdiction, the doctrine is stated thus: “The proposition is universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or damages for its property agreed to be sold or delivered, or damages for its violation. The rule has sometimes been laid down as though it was equally universal, that where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other.” Although certain exceptions to the rule are provided by law, We see no cogent reason why the full force of the rule should not be applied in the instant case.

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Garcia

KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs.HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994

FACTS :

Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.

This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others, that “The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range.”

Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.

On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.

HELD:
Yes.

Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. x x x However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Plaintiff shipped at Maconcon Port, Isabela 940 round logs on board M/V Seven Ambassador, a vessel owned by defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation. Plaintiff insured the logs against loss and/or damage with defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. for P2M and the latter issued its Marine Cargo Insurance Policy on said date. In the meantime, the M/V Seven Ambassador sank resulting in the loss of the plaintiff’s insured logs.

Plaintiff demanded from defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. the payment of the proceeds of the policy but the latter denied liability under the policy. Plaintiff likewise filed a formal claim with defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value of the lost logs but the latter denied the claim.

Court of Appeals affirmed in part the RTC judgment by sustaining the liability of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company (“South Sea”), but modified it by holding that Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation (“Seven Brothers”) was not liable for the lost cargo.

ISSUE:

Whether defendants shipping corporation and the surety company are liable to the plaintiff for the latter’s lost logs.

HELD:

The charter party between the petitioner and private respondent stipulated that the “(o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo” –VALID

There is no dispute between the parties that the proximate cause of the sinking of M/V Seven Ambassadors resulting in the loss of its cargo was the “snapping of the iron chains and the subsequent rolling of the logs to the portside due to the negligence of the captain in stowing and securing the logs on board the vessel and not due to fortuitous event.” Likewise undisputed is the status of Private Respondent Seven Brothers as a private carrier when it contracted to transport the cargo of Petitioner Valenzuela. Even the latter admits this in its petition.

Private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner’s lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party.

In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers.

The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from Anglo-American law. Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is not against public policy and is deemed valid. Such doctrine We find reasonable. The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if the strict public policy governing common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved as in this case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. (Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship Agencies Inc., 23 SCRA 24, April 4, 1968)

Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

On 19 November 1984, LOADSTAR received on board a) 705 bales of lawanit hardwood; b) 27 boxes and crates of tilewood assemblies and the others ;and c) 49 bundles of mouldings R & W (3) Apitong Bolidenized. On its way to Manila from the port of Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, the vessel, along with its cargo, sank off Limasawa Island. As a result of the total loss of its shipment, the consignee made a claim with LOADSTAR which, however, ignored the same. MIC filed a complaint against LOADSTAR and PGAI, alleging that the sinking of the vessel was due to the fault and negligence of LOADSTAR and its employees. LOADSTAR denied any liability for the loss of the shipper’s goods and claimed that sinking of its vessel was due to force majeure. LOADSTAR submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued certificate of public convenience, it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route, and there was only “one shipper, one consignee for a special cargo.

Issues:

(1) Is the M/V “Cherokee” a private or a common carrier?
(2) Did LOADSTAR observe due and/or ordinary diligence in these premises.

Held:

Petition is dismissed:

SC hold that LOADSTAR is a common carrier. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience, and this public character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic, occasional, episodic or unscheduled. The bills of lading failed to show any special arrangement, but only a general provision to the effect that the M/V”Cherokee” was a “general cargo carrier.” 14 Further, the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one shipper, which appears to be purely coincidental, is not reason enough to convert the vessel from a common to a private carrier, especially where, as in this case, it was shown that the vessel was also carrying passengers. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code the Civil Code defines “common carriers” in the following terms:

Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.

On to the second assigned error, we find that the M/V “Cherokee” was not seaworthy when it embarked on its voyage on 19 November 1984. The vessel was not even sufficiently manned at the time. “For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew. The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty.

Republic vs. Cagandahan, GR No. 166676

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower court.

HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case.

In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality” which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.

The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.

Silverio vs. Republic , GR No. 174689

FACTS: On November 22, 2003, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Melly” and sex of birth from “male” to “female” in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered in favor of petitioner as it would be more in consonance with the principle of justice and equity. That grating the petitioner would bring much awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her fiancé and the realization of their dreams. ON August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, thru the office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

ISSUE: Whether or not a person born male would be entitled to change of gender on the civil registrar and afterwards be legally capacitated to entered into marriage with another man.

HELD: No. Sex reassignment is not a ground for change of gender. There is no law present that allows such in our country. Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. As to contracting marriage, our law allows only male and female with the main reason of procreation. Sex reassignment scientifically has not yet made one completely into female, with the complete function for reproduction.