Republic vs Quintero-Hamano (G.R. No. 149498)

FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.

In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.

HELD:The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.

Brenda Marcos vs Wilson Marcos (G.R. No. 136490)

FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the Court of Appeals

ISSUES: 1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

HELD: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidencepresented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditionsince qua non for such declaration.Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may haveresorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on hispart. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they areincurable.Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for aperiod of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,and even left the family home.Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equallyimportant, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychologicalincapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined inMolina.

Republic vs CA and Molina (G.R. No. 108763)

This is a petition for review on certiorari by the Solicitor General assailing the January 25, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 34858 which affirmed the May 14, 1991 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, declaring the respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina and Reynaldo Molina’s marriage as void ab initio, on the ground of “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code.

FACTS:

Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.

Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals & Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos (G.R. No. 112019)

FACTS: Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julia’s psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouel’s petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.

HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term “psychological incapacity”, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term “psychological incapacity” defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by

(a) gravity,

(b) juridical antecedence, and

(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

Lester Halili vs Chona Halili (G.R. No. 165424)

FACTS: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.

He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake.

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.

The case was elevated to the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.

Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not, psychological incapacity of the petitioner is a sufficient ground for the nullity of marriage. Whether or not decision of the Regional Trial Court should be reinstated.

HELD: Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder as:

^{a personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.} 

In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioners mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real.

Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent

From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void

The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is REINSTATED.

Azcueta vs. Republic (G.R. No. 180668)

Facts: Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Marietta complained that despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and always depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the monthly rental. Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money which actually came from Rodolfo’s mother. When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told her his parents could support their needs. They had sex only once a month which Marietta never enjoyed. When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a child. When Marietta asked Rodolfo if they could move to another place, he did not agree and she was forced to leave and see if he would follow her. He did not.

Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfo’s family, corroborated Marietta’s testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and relied on the allowance given by his mother who also paid the rentals for the room the couple lived in. The psychiatrist who examined Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature, independent, focused, responsible, had a direction and ambition in life, and was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Based on information gathered from Marietta, the same psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people. The psychiatrist explained that the root cause of the disorder was a cross-identification with Rodolfo’s mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, wasalways out of the house. She added that the problem began during the early stages of Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his marriage. She stated that the problem was severe, because he would not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse, and incurable, because it began in early development and had been deeply ingrained in his personality. She, thus,concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities.

Kenneth Ngo Te vs Rowena Yu Te (G.R. No. 161793)

FACTS: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and the respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the SC the instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent.

ISSUE: Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void?

HELD: The petition for review for certiorari was granted. The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside, and the decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage is, thus, declared null and void. For the fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond. Let it be noted that in Art. 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.

Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne Reyes (G.R. No. 155800)

FACTS: In 1990, Leo married Marie, the latter being ten years his senior. In 1993, Leo filed to annul the marriage due to Marie’s Psychological Incapacity. Leo claimed that Marie persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She would claim that she is a psychologist but she is not. She’d claim she is a singer with the company Blackgold and that she is the latter’s number 1 money maker but she’s not. She’d also spend lavishly as opposed to her monthly income. She fabricates things and people only to serve her make believe world. Leo presented an expert that proved Marie’s PI. Marie denied all Leo’s allegations and also presented an expert to prove her case. The RTC ruled against Marie and annulled the marriage. The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage and was affirmed by the Vatican’s Roman Rata. The CA reversed the decision hence the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant to the case.

HELD: Yes, Psychological Incapacity is attendant. The guidelines established in the Molina case is properly established in the case at bar.

The SC also emphasized what fraud means as contemplated in Art 45 (3) of the FC vis a vis Art 46 of the FC. In PI, the misrepresentation done by Marie points to her inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In Art 45 (3), marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.” These provisions of Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be applied in the case at bar because the misrepresentations done by Marie is not considered as fraud but rather such misrepresentations constitute her aberrant behaviour which further constitutes PI. Her misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate Leo’s consent to marry her. Her misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish fiction/fantasy from reality which is so grave and it falls under the fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.

The Family Code

MARRIAGE is
1. A special contract
2. Of permanent union
3. Between a man and a woman
4. Entered into in accordance with law
5. For the establishment of conjugal and family
life

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE:
1. Legal capacity of contracting parties
2. Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer

FORMAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE:
1. Authority of solemnizing officer
2. Valid marriage license (except in cases where a marriage license is not required), valid only for 120 days from issue in any part of the Philippines
3. Marriage ceremony where the contracting parties appear before the solemnizing officer, with their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera (G.R. No. 80116)

FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case for adultery should prosper.
Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.